1.

Introduction
The relationship between shareholding concentration and shareholder voting power and the question of corporate control has long been recognised as being of central importance in the economies of the firm and has given rise to a large literature. Despite this, however, and the fact that quite sharp differences in perspective exist in this literature, relatively little work has been done on actually attempting to measure, in a theoretically rigorous way, the quantitative significance of empiricallyobserved differences in concentration on the distribution of power.
on the other hand the literature on game theory is replete with theoretical examples of the application of the theory of simple games to shareholder voting. Although methods for applying this theory to realworld voting situations exist, little work appears to have been done on this particular question, although applications have been made to problems 1/ in political science. This paper is an investigation of the empirical application of the method of power indices for simple games to shareholder voting using data for a sample of British companies collected by Collett and Yarrow, previously analysed by them (1976) and by Cubbin and Leech (1983) . The paper has three main aims: (i) to establish the feasibility of computing power indices using observed shareholding distributions;
(ii) to form a view about patterns of distribution of shareholder voting power in typical British companies; 2.
(iii) to compare the results of empirical application of the two main indices of power (the Shapley-Shubik index and the Normalised Banzhaf index).
In Sections 2, 3 and 4 the theory of power indices for simple games is described. Section S describes the probabilystic`interpxetation which is the foundation of empirical approximation algorithms, while the computational aspects are described in Sections 6 and ?. Section 9 describes the empirical results.
Simple Games
An arbitrary n-person game is defined by a set of players N = i1,2,...,n and a characteristic function V(.) which associates with each subs ))) ) et or coalition TCN a number V(T). The characteristic function V satisfies two conditions:
{' ) V(~) = O? (ii) V (SUT) y V (S) + V(T) for all sets S,TCN.
For this game the Shapley Value is a well-known solution concept.
This is defined as a vector y -(ylIY2''°''Yn) whose elements are defined by the formula: A weighted majority game, r, with n players is written: F = Iq; PiIP2 1 ,,,,p~ where q is a quota and pl,p2,,..,pn are weights. In the present application the weights are normalised to sum to 1. A coalition T is winning if E P. 2 q and losing if E p. < q, ieT 1 iET 1 4.
3.
Power Indices
For a simple game the value is a vector of power indices which measure the voting power of each player. Two power indices are considered: 3/ (i) the Shapley-Shubik index, and (ii) the Banzhaf index. Both are based on the concept of swing.
A swing for player i is a coalition, S C N -f 4 such that V(S) = 0 but V(SUji~ = 1, i.e. p < q and E p, + p, > q. The l je.S ic, Dower index for player i is the relative number of swings for that player. The two approaches differ in the way swings are counted.
(I)
The Shapley-Shubik 'Gower Index for r is the Shapley value. 4.
Properties
The Shapley-Shubik index has the property that E'yi = 1 and can therefore be thought of as apportioning total voting power among the players. This property is shared by the Normalised Banzhaf index.
The Shapley-Shubik index also has a simple interpretation as the probability of a swing for each player given a certain model of random coalition formation. The Banzhaf swing probability shares this property although the coalition model assumed is different. The Swing Probabilities do not, however, sum to unity.
Specifically, the model of coalition formation underlying the Shapley-Shubik index is one in which players are added sequentially in the build-up of the grand coalition, N. All n! orderings of the players are regarded as equally likely and the weight assigned to a given swing is equal to the number of ways of ordering the players given the swing.
This approach is therefore based on counting permutations and coalitions of different size are given different weights.
On the other hand, the model of coalition formation assumed by the Banzhaf approach has no regard to orderings of players. Each swing is counted just once and the weight attached to a swing of a given size is the number of combinations of players. Each coalition is treated as equally likely and every coalition is given the same weight regardless of its size.
Which power index is better will depend on which of these alternative coalition models is more appropriate in the context of analysis. However the coalition model on which it is based has been criticised by Brams (1975) among others, with the implication that mathematical elegance is achieved at the expense of behavioural implausibility. It has been suggested that the assumption that all orderings are.equally probable 5j is unduly strong in a model of power in a legislature. Treating coalitions 6/ as equally probable may be a less strong assumption.
In empirical studies of the distribution of power in voting 7/ bodies, however, the two indices have tended to agree fairly closely.' It is not difficult, though, to construct examples in which there is sharp disagreement. one case, which is of importance to analysis of shareholder voting, is the game in which there is a single player with weight pl = a and n-1 minor players each with weight p i = (1-a)/(n-1), i = 2,...,n. It is well known that in the limit as n > ~, 8/ Yl -a/(1-a), Rl -1 and Ri -} 1. Thus if 25 percent of the stock is held in a single bloc while the remainder is distributed equally in a large number of individual holdings, the Shapley-Shubik power index for the large bloc is 1/3 while the Banzhaf index is 1 (Dubey and Shapley, 1979) .
5.
Probabilistic Voting
An alternative probabilistic basis for both the Shapley-Shubik index and the Swing Probability can be given which does not require a model of coalition formation. This approach also leads to simple algorithms for computing power indices based on reasonable approximations.
On the other hand, applying the coalitional definitions directly would be prohibitively expensive, even for low-dimensional problems. 
S
The term inside the summation sign is a Beta function, which can be written:
s! n-s-1:
The integral can be interpreted as a probability. Letting Tr be the probability that player j ~ i votes the same way as i (player i is assumed to vote strategically rather than randomly), then the expression under the integral sign in (6) , n S (1-, T) n-s-1 is the probability of the swing S occurring given Tr. Summing over all swings gives the probability of a swing given Tr,
Hence, substituting (6) and (7) into (2),
The Banzhaf Swing Probability assigns equal probability to each outcome and therefore is obviously obtained from (7) on assuming players vote indifferently. Hence, setting n = 1/2 we have,
The theory underlying this approach is given by Owen (1972 Owen ( , 1975 .
Straffin (1977, 1979) has suggested an explicit probabilistic model of behaviour to underlie this interpretation. filie'voting probability n is assumed to be a random variable with some distribution on (0,1),
This variable represents the strength of support in a vote on some particular issue. Since there are many possible issues and the analysis is of power in an abstract, strategic sense unrelated to issues, it is assumed that this distribution is uniform. Two assumptions about the choice of Tr from this distribution are:
(i) Homogeneity. A value n is selected at random by all players j ~ i.
Independence. The mean Tr = 1/2 is chosen by all players j $ i.
The independence assumption leads to the swing probability (9) Bl = fi(E11T)) = fi(1/2) and is equivalent to assuming an "average" issue on which players are indifferent, making each coalition equally likely. This assumption is the same as that employed by Cubbin and 10.
11. Leech (1983) who justified it in terms of a hypothetical standard situation in which control of the company had become an issue on which shareholders 9/ were equally divided.
On the other hand, the homogeneity assumption leads to the Shapley-Shubik index. This assumption says that on any issue players will share a common degree of support and therefore a common voting probability 7r.
Given Tr, player is probability of affecting the outcome is fi (Tr). However allowing for all possible degrees of support means defining the power index as the average of f i (TO over the distribution of Tr. Then, yi = Efi (7) which is given by (8).
It is clear from this interpretation that the Shapley-Shubik index employs stronger assumptions than the Banzhaf approach since (i) is more restrictive than (ii). The Shapley-Shubik index requires an assumption about the shape of the whole distribution of Tr -that it is uniform -while the Banzhaf indices require only that it have a mean of 1/2 . The requirement of a uniform distribution means that all possible degrees of support in votes be given equal weight, an assumption which can be criticised on grounds similar to those of Brans' criticisms described above. It is arguably more reasonable to assume voting probabilities to be clustered around the mean. Sraffin (1977) provides generalisations of this.
Computation : Complete Data
Computation of both power indices requires the evaluation of the probability of a swing, fi(Tr), given Tr. The Banzhaf Swing Probability is then given by (9) and the Normalised Banzhaf index by (5). The
Shapley-Shubik index is calculated by integrating (7) as in (8).
In order to calculate (7), the probability of a swing for i
given Tr, suppose player j~ i casts P votes with probability Tr.
The number of votes cast by j is a random variable x i. , with a dichotomous distribution with mean E (xj ) = Trpj and variance var (x j ) = Tr (1-Tr) p? .
Votes cast by different players are assumed to be independent and the x.'s are independently distributed. Let the total number of votes cast by all players be X, . Then,
For large n and provided that no P is much larger than the others, X. has a normal distribution. Let the standard normal I distribution function be V.). Then,
The Shapley-Shubik index can be found by numerically integrating The non-observed smaller holdings are assumed to be as highly concentrated as possible. Let m be the largest integer no greater than k (1-Ck)/Pk where C = E pi.
The non-observed holdings are assumed to i=l consist of m holdIn"s of sage Pk and one holding, Pk+m+1, of size Pk+m+1 1 7Ck-mnk. The game is therefore: r1 = I1 /2 1 p1,...,pk.
•..Pk,....Pk+m+ll computing power indices for r1 using the method described in section 6 gives lower bounds on power indices for the largest holdings.
Limit 2. Least Concentrated Distribution
The non-observed holdings are assumed to be equal and held by an arbitrarily large number of players. Let the number of these minor players 13.
be r.
Then pi = (1-Ck Ur, for all i > k.
Consider first the Shapley-Shubik index. The random variable , I has variance
As r --the variance of the sum of the minor weights (the second term sri the RHS) goes to zero. The mean of Xi remains unchanged. The algorithm is therefore the same as in Section 6 after setting k 2
The Banzhaf Swing Probability is computed on the same basis by the method described in Section 6. However, the Normalised Banzhaf index requires the calculation of the normalising constant. However it is unnecessary to do this since use can be made here of a limit theorem due to Dubey and Shapley (1979) .
Denote the game in which the minor weights are all equal by r2 = F1/2; rl, ... ,pk, 1-C k,..., 1-C k and the swing Probability and Normalr r ised Banzhaf index by S!(F and Si(P2), i=l~.,.,k, respectively.
Consider the game r3 = r1/2 -(1-Ck ) /2; pit... Table 1 . Table 1 shows the results obtained for three randomly selected companies, EMI, William Press and Gill and Duffus, for which the numbers of holdings observed are 265, 154 and 146 respectively. Column (1) contains the weights, pi , column (2) the Shapley-Shubik indices yi, and column (3) the corresponding power ratios, p, = yi/pi' expressed as percentages.
The remaining columns contain the results for the Banzhaf indices.
Calculations of the Swing Probabilities and the Shapley-Shubik indi were carried out using both the limiting assumptions described in Section 7 but the results were in close agreement. It is clear from this that the fact given in column (6) are always much greater than both those for i(min)
in column (4) and y in column (2). This is true for every distribution analysed and results from use of the limit theorem for the Banzhaf index described above which gives all power to the major players in the limit as the number of minor players (corresponding to unobserved holdings) goes to infinity (and their individual holdings go to zero). Column (5) reports the power ratio based on Si(min).
The approximation error is a measure of the error in the approximation used to compute the Shapley-Shubik index. Theoretically, this index must satisfy E yi = 1. The approximation error is defined for the k+m+l most concentrated limiting case, as 100( E yi -1). It can be seen i=1 that, for two of these companies, this error is very small (under one percent) while for the other case it is quite large (over 5 percent).
The distribution of the approximation errors over the shareholding distributions studied is presented in Table 2 . In the great majority of cases it is very small (in 62 cases less than 0.1 percent) but in a number of cases it is quite large (in 4 cases greater than 10 percent).
In all cases where the error is large there is a single, very large holding much 2o.
bigger than the others and the normality assumption is therefore invalid. 
21.
concentrated case, $1 (min), however, gives a power ratio greater than 100 to only one holding. The increase in power of this holding, however, is much greater, at 29.53 percent. The other Normalised Banzhaf index gives power to every holding observed. This is a feature common to all the shareholding distributions analysed and for this reason little confidence is placed in these indices.
In Table 1 (b), William Press, both y and ~i (min) show power greater than weight for three holdings with again the latter showing a greater inequality in the distribution of power.
In Table 1 
SHAPLEY S BANZHAF POWER RATIOS VS S/HOLDING SIZE=WILLIAM PRESS
22.
FlQura l C a). Fiy-ure 1(e) The power discrepancy plotted in Figure 8 is the extent to which power is redistributed from the twentieth shareholder to the first. The power discrepancy is defined as the difference between the power ratio for i = 1 and for i = 20. Thus on the vertical axis the Banzhaf power discrepancy is S1/pl -B2 and and the Shapley-Shubik power discrepancy (ii) The characteristic pattern observed for all distributions is that the Shapley-Shubik power ratio is much closer to being a linear function of shareholding than the Banzhaf power ratio.
SHAPLEY & BANZHAF POWER RATIOS VS SMOLDING SIZE, COURTAULDS
SHAPLEY&BANZHAF VALUES VS S/HOLDING SIZE:NOTT MANUF ORDINARY
(iii) In all cases except one the Banzhaf power ratio exceeds the Shapley-Shubik power ratio for a small number of large holdings.
In some cases this excess is quite large.
40.
(iv) Banzhaf (1965 Banzhaf ( , 1968 , Owen (1978) . Shapley (1953) . The three axioms are: symmetry (equal indices for players of equal weight); efficiency (indices sum to unity over players and therefore provide a distribution of power); additivity (the distribution of power in two independent games is the same as that obtained by evaluating the two games separately).
4/
5/
A player's power depends on the frequency with which he is able to affect the outcome as the last member to join an ordered coalition which becomes minimal-winning. The model of coalition formation assumed is a legislature in which, for a given bill, members may be arranged in order of support. The bill's sponsors, in organising a minimal majority, are assumed to enlist the support of members sequentially beginning with the most supportive. In order to recruit 'Less supportive members, the sponsors must bargain with them and pay a price in terms of amending the bill or supporting other measures. The highest price will be paid to the marginal T ember or "pivot" who is by definition the least supportive member of the winning coalition. This seems a not-unreasonable model of coalition formation in many applications. But it assumes a single ranking ofinembers and there will in general be many such attitudinal dimensions.
In constructing the power index it is necessary to allow for all of them.
By treating all orderings of the n members as eauiprobable, the Shapley-Shubik index is implicitly assuming that the number of attutudinal dimensions in the legislature is precisely n; It is clear that, even for small legislative bodies, the number of such rankings is truly enormous. It seems more reasonable to assume that the number of issues on which legislators take up positions is determined-independently of the size of the legislature. Moreover, statistical analyses of actual voting bodies have revealed that votes on concrete issues can be expressed in terms of a small number of attitudinal dimensions (see the rei'd":ences quoted by Brams) .
See also Riker (1964) .
6/ The Banzhaf indices are not subject to the criticism made in the previous footnote. They are defined in terms of critical defections from minimal-winning coalitions without regard to their order of formation. In applying power indices to shareholdings the question of which index is the more appropriate can be thought of as depending in part on whether shareholders can be ranked along a very large number of attitudinal dimensions or whether wn should treat all coalitionsas equally likely. See Dubey and Shapley (1979) and Shapiro and Shapley (1978) . The limiting behaviour of the Shapley-Shubik indices in a stockholder-voting game with two large holdings has been analysed by Milnor and Shapley (1978) .
9/
The measure of power employed by Cubbin and Leech and by Leech (1984 Leech ( , 1985 is the degree of control, a, defined for the largest shareholding bloc only, as the probability of majority support for that holding in an explicit model of probabilistic voting which allows abstentions. Disallowing abstentions gives the relation between the degree of control and the Swing Probability as ~j = 2a-1.
10/ These results are based on the assumption that there are no "pitfall" points for which the limiting Banzhaf indices for the major players are zero. A finite number of these points may occur at which the number of minor swings becomes so numerous that the relative number of swings for each major player goes to zero. This problem is assumed to be unimportant empirically.
11/ For every company ordinary shareholdings were analysed. In some cases where there were more than one type of ordinary share each distribution was analysed separately. The total number of shareholding distributions analysed (after excluding two companies in the sample which had a majority shareholding and after amalgamating two ordinary share distributions for each of GEC and Rank Hovis MacDougall) was 92.
12/ The power ratio is taken as the relevant measure of "bias" in voting.
It should be noted that for both indices and for all deistributions their simple correlations with shareholdings and with each other are extremely high, in excess of 0.98.
